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This study focuses on the themes of materiality an immateriality in the legislative  
hearing  of  the  Stop  Online  Piracy  Act  (‘SOPA’).  Driven  by  the  associations  
between intangible intellectual ‘property’ and tangible ‘property’ voiced in the le-
gislative hearing on the 16th of November 2011, this study seeks to explore the rep-
resentation of materiality and immateriality. The SOPA hearing is used as a frame-
work to help contextualise and ‘ground’ the different discourses. It is hoped that by  
identifying latent assumptions and discourses in the hearing, it may help encour-
age more transparent discussion and reduce the potency of the ‘property’ rhetoric  
in IP debates. 
Critical discourse analysis was employed to investigate the discursive tensions  
between materiality and immateriality. This was supported by a conceptual frame-
work bringing together theories and concepts of networked information societies,  
globalisation, digital objects, the construction of national/digital borders, and the  
intellectual property rhetoric. 
The study finds that the articulations of the networked information society, con-
sumer/producer,  and  the  digital  object  are  markedly  different  from  the  theory  
presented in this study. The networked information society is discursively demarc-
ated into areas  of  legitimacy and illegitimacy, while drawing out parallels with  
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physical networks of lawful behaviour and criminal enterprises. The information  
society is framed as a ‘gateway’ for the non-virtual world. Furthermore, the net-
work is not portrayed as a site of user creativity or production, connecting the user  
to connotations of passivity and illness. Lastly, the digital object adopts qualities of  
physical goods, enabling the digital object to fit into the paradigm of non-virtual  
theft. 
KEYWORDS 
Online Piracy, Materiality, Immateriality, Internet, Stop Online Piracy Act
1. INTRODUCTION
When the second H.R.3261 Stop Online Piracy Act (‘SOPA’) hearing was 
video-streamed on 15th of December 2011, over 219,000 visitors had tuned 
in to watch the hearing (Higginbotham, 2011). Plans for large-scale protests 
were underway; and over 87,000 calls had been made to Congress protest-
ing SOPA (Digital Digest,  2011). On January 20th 2012, the United States 
Congress withdrew SOPA due to worldwide public scrutiny. 
It all began with the drive to fix the problem of widespread intellectual 
property (‘IP’) infringement (Department for Professional Employees, 2010). 
Prosecuting individual infringers failed to eliminate the issue due to general 
populace ambivalence, while foreign countries with laxer IP protection be-
came hotspots for purchasing counterfeit  goods (Boland, 2006).  Congress 
looked for a different approach and found it in SOPA. SOPA’s provisions 
brought different parties of the Internet ecosystem under the same Bill: pay-
ment  processers,  advertisement  networks,  user-generated  websites,  and 
search  engines  all  had additional  obligations  under  the  Bill.  Section  102 
equipped the Attorney General with new powers requiring US-based search 
engines, service providers and other websites to remove access to websites 
with  substantial  infringing  content,  preventing  ‘foreign  rogue  websites’ 
from reaching the American market. 
Analyses on SOPA’s controversial provisions and debates were conduc-
ted by many parties, including constitutional scholars (Lemley, Levine, & 
Post,  2011;  Tribe  &  Ammori,  2011)  to  system  administrations  (Harvey, 
2012), some claiming that SOPA was in a constitutionally precarious posi-
tion and had a  tenuous  understanding  of  the  technical  implications.  On 
November  16th,  SOPA’s  legislative  hearing  was  similarly  criticised  for 
‘techno-ignorance’ (Thierer, 2011); Congressman Lofgren admitted ‘we have 
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no technical expertise on this panel today.’ (Bachman, 2011) The debate had 
gone from technical to rhetorical.
It is not the aim for this study to conduct legal analysis on SOPA, but to 
uncover the underlying discourses surrounding the debate. As the hearing 
progressed, it became more apparent that this was a norm-instilling exercise 
(Saunders, 2006, p.176) and drew upon general IP tropes to strengthen its 
claim. This study therefore is about SOPA in that it uses it as a salient, in-
structive case study - but the issues do not end when SOPA is shelved. The 
discourses enveloping SOPA’s debates are similar to the ones found in oth-
er areas of IP regulation, and will appear again (Logie, 2006).
I have chosen to focus on the concept of property and intangibility; ma-
teriality  and the  immateriality  within  the  context  of  SOPA.  Long before 
SOPA was  proposed,  scholars  already  expressed  misgivings  at  the  term 
‘property’ in ‘intellectual property’ (Lessig, 2004; Vaidhyanathan, 2001). The 
question is not purely about semantics, however, and I believe it extends 
across a variety of concepts: from the information society to the physical in-
frastructures  storing the data;  and the restrictions  on physical  import  of 
counterfeits  versus  information’s  permeability  across  technological  ones. 
Research on the topic of materiality/immateriality discourse in IP regulation 
has tended to focus on and isolate specific parts of the debate, e.g. near-ex-
clusive  emphasis  on the  linguistics  of  piracy  (Mirghani,  2011;  Loughlan, 
2006). Research on the nature and structure of digital objects in the context 
of immateriality/materiality and IP infringement is also limited (Kallinikos, 
et al., 2010). This study attempts to bridge that gap because the themes of 
materiality/immateriality are present at all  stages of the information eco-
logy. From users and digital borders to global networks and information, is-
sues of tangibility and tangibility remain salient. 
It is hoped that this study will help uncover latent assumptions and dis-
courses, encouraging open and transparent discussion about the future of IP 
regulation and minimise susceptibility towards rhetoric. 
2. THEORETICAL BASIS
This section first seeks to outline the context behind the research question: 
how has our information-rich and networked society impacted the salience 
of physical, national borders? This will touch on concepts of the construc-
tion of nationalism and sovereignty, which are in constant tension with the 
abundance of cross-bordering information networks.  I will  then focus on 
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the question of immateriality and materiality, paying particular attention to 
the constitution of digital objects and the way this enables fluid flows of in-
formation.  This  section  seeks  to  highlight  the  tensions  between  the  un-
bundled, borderless and editable digital object and the notions of material-
ity and property found embedded in SOPA hearings and copyright  dis-
courses.
2.1 GLOBALISATION AND THE NETWORKED INFORMATION 
SOCIETY
Answering the research question involves clarification on the context to illu-
minate the various power struggles within SOPA discourses. As Wang ar-
gues, ‘an examination of piracy [and] copyright ... would not be complete 
without situating these issues in larger contexts of power, technology and 
the networking logic  of globalization’  (2003, p.25).  It  is  important to em-
phasise the impact of information ubiquity in a networked society here, par-
ticularly because SOPA’s discourses are about managing these information 
flows to alter perceptions on copyright infringement (Barron, 2012, p.2). 
I included both globalisation and networked information society in the 
same header because I argue that one begets the other –it is difficult to refer 
to them in isolation. Globalisation’s concepts of ‘interconnectedness’ (Sch-
euerman, 2010) and ‘integration’ (Quah, 2009, p.19) are some of the main 
features of the information society (Castells, 2001; Castells, 1996; Freeman & 
Soete, 1997). The concept of the information society explains how society re-
acts to globalisation, and also focuses on the production, utilisation and dis-
semination of data. In turn, this increased informational activity can, too, 
impact the wider processes of globalisation (Albrow, 1996). They are there-
fore entwined in various ways; including both in the same section would al-
low efficient bridging of concepts where needed.
Discourse  on  globalisation  risks  being  termed  ‘globaloney’  (Scholte, 
2002, p.6) because the word has no clear unanimous meaning and is prone 
to being used for any phenomena loosely related to it (Martens, Dreher, & 
Gaston, 2010, p.574). The definition seems to vary according to the research-
er. For some, it is the greater integration of economic processes across na-
tion-states and the global arena (Quah, 2009), but other definitions include 
the ‘Americanization’ of culture (Friedman, 1999; White et al., 2007), a con-
dition of space-time compression (Harvey, 1990) or distanciation (Giddens, 
1990),  amplified distribution of technology and ideas (Albrow, 1996),  the 
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declining significance of national sovereignty (Beck, 1999; Strange, 1996), a 
partial deterritorialisation of the global economy (Sassen, 1996), or a new di-
vision of labour/power (Mittelman, 2000). Some authors also refer to ‘glocal-
ization’ to emphasise the interlinking between global processes and local in-
fluences, such as the use of the social networking sites to plan local groups, 
or the adaptation of international products to the local markets (Robertson, 
1992).
The issue of these definitions is  that there is some conflation between 
what  is globalisation and the  effects of globalisation. For instance, is it that 
the increased distribution of technology  leads  to a new division of labour 
and power? Additionally, these definitions are derived from scholars who 
belong to a number of diverse fields, such as economics, cultural studies,  
politics,  sociology,  media,  and international  relations  (Mooney  & Evans, 
2007). This multidisciplinary nature of globalisation studies is why Mooney 
and Evans suggest that the meaning of globalisation will always be in dis-
pute because it derives many of its lexicons from different fields (2007, p.ix). 
While this in itself does not take away value from globalisation studies, it 
should be noted that the ‘answers’ derived from the studies are very much 
shaped by the questions asked. 
Some of the definitions of more relevance to this study are Harvey’s and 
Giddens’ ideas of space-time distanciation. According to Giddens, time and 
space are altered so that ‘presence’ is connected with ‘absence’ (1990, p.14). 
This phenomenon enables the local to intersect with the global and presents 
a stark contrast to ‘traditional’ societies, which relied more heavily on place 
and time. Time-space distanciation extracts social relations from local scen-
arios and the result is phantasmagoria: localities are shaped by distant influ-
ences.
Importantly, some corporations have sought to reduce dependency on 
time  and  space  by  retaining  more  control  over  the  production  process 
across geographical areas (e.g. a film studio collaborates with or takes over 
a foreign film distribution company). This helps stimulate a different struc-
ture of operations: businesses are no longer clustered amongst a particular 
locale,  but  are ‘horizontal’  (Castells,  1996, p.166),  ‘unbundled’  (both geo-
graphically and functionally) and connected by various communication net-
works (Kallinikos, et al., 2010). For instance, the Kindle’s functions are un-
bundled because many different publishing companies around the world, 
outside of Amazon, help create content for the Kindle (e-books, software). 
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The manufacturing process occurs in China, Taiwan and South Korea. Den-
ning comments that ‘Amazon's Kindle 2 couldn't be made in the U.S., even 
if Amazon wanted to.’ (2011) 
The increasing presence of digital technology allows these disparate and 
unbundled bodies to cooperate together across multiple time-zones, juris-
dictions and localities (White, et al., 2007, p.196). Harvey’s (1990) research 
predicted a similar outcome of time and space barriers becoming less ob-
structive  due to improved efficiency of communication  technologies  and 
transportation. Harvey further underlines the ‘de-materialisation’ (White, et 
al., 2007, p.233) of objects such as money into information enable faster in-
ternational processing, particularly in wake of growing importance of in-
stantaneity. Castells (2004), however, warns that information exchange has 
always been important for every society. The difference is that, in these cur-
rent times, information generation, distribution and processing become the 
actual product and the source of productivity (Castells, 1996; Mansell, 2003, 
p.3). Freeman and Soete concur, arguing that the ‘ICT paradigm’ of produc-
tion and distribution of knowledge across different networks is a key factor 
of the information society (1997, p.3).
The definition of the information society, however, is also unsurprisingly 
subject to some uncertainty. The very general idea appears to encompass 
the overall increase in economic activities and technical interaction related 
to knowledge as a commodity (Lyotard, 1984; Drucker, 1969), leading to a 
‘qualitatively new sort of social system’ (Webster, 2006, p.9; Mansell, 2003). 
Webster points out five ways that the ‘information society’ can be defined 
by:  technological,  economic,  occupation,  spatial  and  cultural  (2006,  p.8). 
Briefly put, the technological perspective argues that technology has reor-
ganised the social experiences and life – the instantaneity of exchanges is a 
facet of the information society (Connors, 1993). The economics perspective, 
on the  other  hand,  maps  the  progress  of  the  information  society  by the 
amount of informational activities corresponding to a quantitative gain or 
loss (e.g. GDP). The occupational perspective argues that an information so-
ciety  has  been  reached  when  most  of  the  work  undertaken  is  informa-
tion-based  (Bell,  1980),  while  the  spatial  perspective  echoes  Giddens’ 
thoughts on the re-arrangement of time-space (1990). Lastly, Webster claims 
that the cultural perspective is about the phenomenological experience of 
experiencing an information-saturated life (2006, p.19). All of these explana-
tions are problematic in some way: the occupational and technological per-
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spectives risk being vague (i.e. Webster (2006, p.11) asks ‘how much ICT is 
required in order to identify an information society?’) while the economic 
and cultural perspectives encounter issues of measurability (Monk, 1989).
One of the few unifying threads between the five perspectives is the no-
tion of the  immateriality of  knowledge goods that  now permeate society, 
which  Castells  claims  signals  a  major  restructuring  of  capitalism  (1996, 
p.18). Scholars refer to this economic shift as ‘weightless’ (Quah, 2005) or 
‘digital’  (Margherio,  1998).  As Stehr posits,  a knowledge society is  when 
there is an ‘extensive penetration of all its spheres of life and institutions by 
scientific  and technological  knowledge’ (2002, p.18).  Readers of these de-
scriptions may expect that the immaterial has now totally eclipsed the ma-
terial.  In some ways,  knowledge and data have begun to permeate jobs, 
activities and economies (Kallinikos & Mariátegui, 2011), but there are other 
factors at play: there are a plethora of cultural and legal aspects that are im-
pacted and impact this phenomenon (Castells, 2000). For example, as copy-
right infringement grows more extensive, the US has become more ardent 
on stopping piracy at national borders (Smith, 2011).  All knowledge and 
data are, in  some way, anchored to the physical  – for example, data are 
stored in a physical server – and therefore are often subject to restrictions 
applied to physical property (e.g. national law). The many economic, cultur-
al and social issues surrounding the difficult dichotomy of ‘free’ knowledge 
and  ‘restricted’  physical  objects  cannot  be  understated  (Denegri-Knott, 
2004).
In light of this, the concept of the ‘network society’ was used to emphas-
ise economic, cultural and social aspects of the information society (Castells, 
2004): how has the way people interact and connect changed as a result of 
the knowledge society? According to Castells, the network society is about 
how ‘key social structures and activities are organized around electronically 
processed information networks’ (Anon., 2001). This may help explain how 
the thriving Internet commons came to be: the Internet facilitates commu-
nication but  the large-scale  the exchange of ideas  and knowledge across 
global networks (while at the same time resisting market pricing or corpor-
ate hierarchies) resonates with this idea of the network society (Benkler & 
Nissenbaum, 2006). In a similar vein, van Dijk argues that this new social 
structure helps connect previously unconnected spheres, such as the indi-
vidual to the group and the individual to the societal (1999); it is the flow of 
information, knowledge and culture filling a decentralised and ever-present 
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network. Accordingly, he defines the network society as a ‘social formation 
with  an  infrastructure  of  social  and  media  networks  enabling  its  prime 
mode of organisation at all levels.’ (2006, p.20)
The networked information  society  brings forward new conditions  of 
possibility that enable corporations to dismantle the model of concentrated 
capital in geographical localities. These actors are able to work with others 
across borders and contort the conditions of space and time. However, it 
should not be forgotten that there are ongoing tensions between free-flow-
ing information networks and the physical infrastructures that produce and 
enable these networks. Sassen’s ground-breaking work on economic global-
isation argues that there are economic and political processes (e.g. occurring 
through international  law firms interacting with  different  cross-bordered 
parties) that create complex global networks, highlighting challenges of re-
conciling  different  legal  jurisdictions  (Sassen,  1996,  p.10).  Despite  this,  it 
would be unrealistic to claim that national and territorial borders have little 
pertinence even under the presence of multiple processes and international 
treaties (Jayasuriya, 1999, p.432). For example, it is the national legislation 
and government initiatives that often fund and govern the Internet infra-
structure. Describing the significance of the State as simply either declining 
or expanding ignores the fact that even international information networks 
and cross-bordering corporations are anchored, sometimes quite firmly, to 
national grounds and material infrastructures (Sassen, 1996, p.16). 
2.2 THE MANY FACES OF BORDERS
In order to examine the processes behind the vast cross-border networks of 
information, the exploration of the concept of borders is beneficial. Origin-
ally derived from bordure, it referred to the edge of a shield, and later in the 
1530s  adopted  the  geopolitical  definition  as  a  boundary  separating  geo-
graphical and physical areas (Harper, 2001). The territorial definition is de-
rived from Descartes’ view of space as objectively viewable, measurable, ex-
ternal and material (Slowik, 2009). Aristotle and Kant, on the other hand, 
perceived the border as constructed cognitively and therefore subjectively 
perceived (Cooper & Rumford, 2011, p.267); this constructivist perspective 
has remained salient (Boer, 2006).
Since the growth of the information age and the compression of time and 
space, the concept of the border solely as a separator of nations has become 
strained  (Cammaerts  &  Van  Audenhove,  2005,  p.185).  Looking  beyond 
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methodological  nationalism – the  assumption  that  the  nation/state  is  the 
quintessential, ‘natural’ form of society (Beck, 2011) – unveils a large body 
of research driven by the multiplicity of borders and bordering processes 
now occurring in the modern society (Balibar, 2004; Hedetoft, 2003; Turner, 
2007). As Cooper and Rumford argue: ‘we must dispense with the idea that 
borders always correspond to the edges of the nation-state ... borders can 
now be diffused throughout society.’ (2011, p.263)
Arenas of bordering now include places such as travel agencies or online 
flight booking services, where travel documents are checked against a data-
base  and can  be  rejected or  approved.  In  following  this  trend,  Hedetoft 
(2003) emphasises that borders are developing finer-grained selections and 
are able to filter according to the minute details. This depicts borders not as 
strictly  lined  separators  but  processes and commands reacting  and sorting 
through the entrance and exit of goods, data and people. In other words, 
borders  ‘manage  mobilities  both  within  and  outside  of  state  territory.’ 
(Cooper & Rumford, 2011, p.267) 
Since these borders are processes, they are also constantly changing and 
dependent on ‘the activity of ordinary people’ - people who resist, construct 
or  dismantle  certain  borders (Cooper & Rumford,  2011,  p.264;  Rumford, 
2008). While border-construction is not a new phenomenon and has existed 
since the ages of smugglers and tourists (Cooper & Rumford, 2011, p.264), 
borders more ubiquitous because they are unconfined to national boundar-
ies: Beck explains that ‘it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between 
the national and international’ (2003, p.458) because borders are now closer 
to  embodying  networks.  For  instance,  borders in  modern society  do not 
simply restrict, and networks are not only free-for-all access points (Axford, 
2006,  p.6):  their  functions  have become intertwined  and more mobile  in 
nature.  Aas questions (2007,  p.179):  ‘How does one grapple,  empirically, 
with the concept of a border ... when a border is no longer a ‘wall’ around 
a ... territory, but rather a distributed network of a myriad of checkpoint, 
technologies and actors?’ (my emphasis) 
The articulation of the ‘border’ grows problematic as the definition ex-
pands to encompass developments of the information networked society. 
The conceptualization of the border no longer neatly divides the inside from 
the outside, or from place to place (Cooper & Rumford, 2011, p.266). How-
ever, these bordering processes are still dependent on being legitimised or 
enacted by the State ‘in a top-down fashion’ (p.269). The next section will 
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look at the characteristics of digital objects which permeate across these bor-
ders, because it is perhaps not only the borders that have become more por-
ous and networked – the transferred objects also embody qualities that also 
stimulate global flows of information.
2.3 THE IMMATERIAL DIGITAL OBJECT 
At the core of network society theory is the question of the immaterial digit-
al object. What are the specific characteristics of the digital object that enable 
dissemination across millions of different networks in seconds? This is the 
crux of this study’s research question: this study seeks to highlight specific 
features that immaterial and material objects embody, and how are these 
represented in SOPA’s hearings. Pertinent to the issue of mass-dissemina-
tion and immateriality of digital objects (including copyrighted material) is 
their nature and structure. 
Discussions on the theories of immateriality/materiality are fraught with 
semantic difficulties – Miller therefore warns that concepts may be based on 
‘common sense’  rather  than academic examination (Miller,  2005, p.7).  At 
first, it may seem that immateriality/materiality is a relatively straightfor-
ward concept, as several authors have written (largely) congruent defini-
tions of materiality. Hill suggests that ‘intangibles’ are objects that have ‘no 
physical  dimensions  or  spatial  co-ordinates  of  their  own and have to be 
stored ... on physical media’ (1999, p.427). Hawk and Rieder describe imma-
terial objects as those which are ‘weightless ... not bound by conventional 
rules of physical law ... This virtual reproducibility creates the potential for 
infinite  material  relations and actions.’  (2008,  p.xiii)  Rifkin adds  that ‘the 
tallest buildings, the largest ships, and the heaviest, most physically power-
ful machinery are no longer the centerpieces of American economic value 
and profit.’ (2000, p.30) All of them stress the impact of the immaterial on 
the material, but it is not very clear how they interact with one another. Even 
if the ‘most physically powerful machinery’ has indeed lost some promin-
ence in the market, the efficiency of information flows may nevertheless be 
dependent on the workability of these infrastructures. For example, inter-
acting with immaterial data on computers may be the main reason for its  
utilisation, but the existence of the data is both dependent on and gains im-
portance through the computer’s physical characteristics.  Various authors 
such as Massumi (2002), Lévy (1998) and Hayles (2002) similarly argue that 
the idea of immateriality/materiality should be reconceptualised to emphas-
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ise the symbiotic relationship of the weightless digital object and the physic-
al object. These perspectives therefore lend themselves better to contextual-
ised, case-study analysis, as it is only when magnified and specific that it re-
veals this complimentary relationship. However, the question remains on 
whether - and, if so, how - such a relationship is explored in SOPA hearings. 
On the whole, the networked, digital economy has decreased the prom-
inence of corporate hierarchies and concentrated capital structures (Benkler, 
2003).  Non-market organisations such as charities  or libraries  are able to 
take advantage of the features of the digital object to expand their roles and 
provide new services (2003, p.1254). Faulkner and Runde attribute this to 
the  expansibility  and  non-scarce  nature  of  a  digital  object,  whereby  the 
amount of people who can access this object can be expanded very quickly 
and almost without cost (2011, p.9). Benkler (2003, p.1252) calls this charac-
teristic ‘non-rival’ because the use of the object by one user does not prevent 
usage by another – in some cases, popular use in software may actually cre-
ate additional value. Scarcity, a quality attributed to physical objects and 
can change its  economic value, is  much less of a consideration in digital  
goods due to their non-rival nature. With the cost of distribution and repro-
duction  approaching  zero,  and  greater  movement  of  information  in  the 
form of  both  people  and data  across  global  arenas  (Davis,  2001,  p.473), 
scarcity is a concept that is not easily applied to intangible goods. Resonat-
ing with concepts of globalisation, Quah also comments that ‘dematerial-
ised commodities show no respect for space and geography’ (1996). How-
ever, the digital object is not inherently and independently expansible; it is 
dependent on the commands that are executed on it and its various interac-
tions with the user and associated devices (Faulkner & Runde, 2011, p.9). 
If the digital object is not independently expansible, what is its ‘natural’ 
form? Kallinikos argues that all digital objects are simply bundles of ‘nu-
merically controlled operations’ (2011, p.281) which are temporarily stabil-
ised according to the context (Ekbia, 2009). In other words, an e-book on a 
Kindle is temporarily stabilised as a readable digital object only once the 
specific commands are executed. Its functionality is dependent on the soft-
ware used by the Kindle, the screen resolution, the battery life, and so on. 
After the Kindle is turned off, it ‘decomposes’ and becomes a complex of 
operations. This is congruent with Lévy’s argument that virtual digital ob-
jects are about potential possibilities.  ‘If big physical  things have already 
met their potential,  materialized as they are in reality,’ Hawk and Rieder 
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(2008, p.xii) write, ‘virtual things are potential realities.’ This conceptualisa-
tion presents some implications:  digital objects are reusable because they 
are  simply  composed and decomposed during  operation,  fundamentally 
editable,  unbundled  both  functionally  and  geographically  (Kallinikos  & 
Mariátegui, 2011, p.281), accessible and editable from third-party programs 
(p.283), and distributed (i.e. digital objects are often spread across various 
institutions,  devices,  groups and infrastructures;  Haider & Sundin,  2010). 
Hawk and Rieder also suggest that digital objects have ‘infinite expansibil-
ity’, emphasising the characteristic of weightless flexibility (2008, p.xiii).
The features of editability and re-usability are derived from the digital 
object’s  ability  to  decompose  into  generic  basic  units  (Kallinikos,  et  al., 
2010).  Like  Lego pieces,  they  can  be  dismantled  and put  back  together, 
joined with other digital objects or isolated from them with ease. In other 
words, these digital objects can potentially form distributed, loose networks 
of particular functionalities. This distributed quality enables them to be bor-
derless,  particularly in comparison to physical  objects that have clear out-
lines signalling the object’s entity. For example, a hyperlink on one website 
can open navigation paths for several other websites, and these websites are 
also prone to changes by the website creator and the server the website is  
hosted on. The ‘borders’ of some digital objects are therefore ephemeral and 
numerous; Kallinkos (2010; see also Haider & Sundin, 2010) suggests that 
this produces an ‘ecology’ of fluid digital connections and disconnections. A 
nexus like Google’s search engine is subject to daily influence by multiple 
parties: the search engine algorithm, the users who raise the search rankings 
of each entry, website creators who create keywords for the website, and so 
on. If the website changes, the search result page also changes in turn. In 
this way, it  can defy simple categorisation:  the search results page is de-
pendent on the user’s search query, but these pages are also in  constant 
flux. This page becomes the intermediary between the physical users and 
the cultural records stored and distributed across the Internet (Kallinikos, 
2010).
Looking at this from a less magnified perspective,  users have become 
consumers, influencers, and producers of new content without the need for 
concentrated capital structures. Users are now much closer to the economic 
core of information creation and production. This does not mean that phys-
ical markets are completely displaced – rather, these digital markets exist 
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alongside and ‘interact’ with the physical (Benkler, 2003, p.1246; Landow, 
2006, p.98). 
In a brief aside, digital objects such as information also represent ‘a par-
ticular form of ‘experience good’’ (Davis, 2001, p.473), whereby the digital 
good’s value is tied to the consumer experiencing it. For instance, the value 
of a new film is unknown until it has been viewed. The user is deeply in-
volved in  the appreciation  and the value of the digital  object.  Other ex-
amples of information goods include (but are not limited to) computer soft-
ware, or even the provision of useful information, such as a website recom-
mending discounted hotel rooms at your favourite area – here, the product 
morphs according to user preferences. 
As seen with the recent net neutrality debates and its possible impact on 
the quality of video streaming services, the experienced good’s value is also 
reliant on the way it is transferred or accessed (Selyukh, 2014). A low-qual-
ity streaming video can lessen the experienced value in comparison to a 
high-quality service.  The value of an information object  is  influenced by 
several factors the focus is very much on intangible goods as services (Cas-
tells, 1996; Mansell, 2003, p.3). For example, comparison shopping between 
different  providers  of  home-streaming  entertainment  now takes  into  ac-
count not just the array of customer choices (e.g. the number of movies or 
televisions available to watch) but also the service quality. The implication 
is that when referring to the value of intangible digital goods, they are often 
treated as services; the customer now makes decisions on both the value of 
the digital good and the service provided. Correspondingly, the producer is 
now more closely involved with the  service  quality,  which  may include 
more efficient servers, faster connections, or better web presence – in other 
words, a mixture of both physical infrastructures and digital services inter-
acting with one another. 
The digital object’s fluid value as an experienced good and adherence to 
alternative economic principles raises questions on the divergences between 
material and immaterial goods. Additionally, the role of the user’s influence 
on these digital objects is now becoming central to both the production and 
experience due to less concentrated capital structures. The tension between 
the physical and immaterial is a key theme of this study: how do stakehold-
ers understand the digital object and the implications of it? How are notions 
of  materiality  and  immateriality  represented  in  SOPA’s  discourse?  This 
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study hopes to illuminate some of these processes within the Congress hear-
ings.
2.4 INTELLECTUAL ‘PROPERTY’
This review has outlined the wider contexts and more specific theories rel-
evant to the research question. The purpose of including this section is to 
explain how intellectual property relates to the overall concepts of global-
isation, networked information societies and immaterialism/materialism.
To briefly describe the basics of IP, it is a term used to describe intan-
gible intellectual products such as ideas, inventions, signs, information and 
expressions (Yar, 2005, p.679). Intellectual property rights (IPR) are govern-
ment-mandated, exclusive rights given to creators over their works for a 
specified period of time. These rights may include, amongst others, the right 
to distribute their product and bring action against unlawful copying. IP is  
protected under trademark, copyright and patent law, usually justified un-
der notions of economics and morality (Radin, 1993; Waldron, 1988; Dams-
tedt, 2003). Copyright law – one of the main aspects of SOPA (Smith, 2011) – 
seeks to protect original expressions of artistic, industrial, literary, technical, 
and musical works (WIPO, 2001, p.40). Counterfeiting, which falls under-
neath the umbrella term of copyright, also involves copyright infringement 
(i.e.  unauthorised copying, importing, displaying, selling, transmitting, or 
creation  of  derivative  works  -  see  Yu,  2007)  but  may  also  replicate  the 
copied, original object in terms of tangible packaging, graphics and design 
to mimic authenticity (Kounoupias, 2003).
While IPRs seek to protect intellectual creations of intangible nature such 
as trademarks and trade secrets, the use of ‘property’ in ‘intellectual prop-
erty’ dates back as far as the 18th century. Although Cornish claims that it  
was  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organisation  that  brought  the  term 
‘property’ into popular vocabulary, the term ‘literary and artistic property’ 
was used to describe literary and artistic works in the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic works in 1886. ‘Industrial property’, 
too, was also used to describe industrial creations in the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property (Yu P. K., 2005, p.3; Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886; Paris 
Convention for the Protction of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883). Yu and 
Mossoff posit that one of the earliest references to property was from a 1783 
Massachusetts legislation where ‘there being no property more peculiarly a 
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man's own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind’ (Bently & 
Kretschmer;  Mossoff,  2010;  Yu P.  K.,  2005,  p.3).  Further  analogies  to  the 
quality of property have been applied to these such labours of the mind in a 
1845 case Davoll v. Brown, likening them to ‘as much as the fruit of his hon-
est  industry,  as the wheat  he cultivates,  or  the flock he rears’  (Davoll  v.  
Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 3,662)).
These beginnings of the intellectual ‘property’ narrative echo the early 
philosophical  discussions  first  used  to justify  IPRs.  For  instance,  Locke’s 
theories remain widely debated in this area of law and are often cited in dis-
cussions about justifications for IPR. Locke’s labour theory can be surmised 
as the moral right  to ‘reap what you sow’ (Dibble,  1994),  describing the 
moral  right  to  benefit  from your body’s  labour when the labourer  takes 
from the unowned commons, makes it their exclusive property, and creates 
value through their labour (Gosseries, Marciano, & Strowel, 2008, p.31). The 
original  property is  therefore distinguished and changed through labour; 
the labourer then has a moral right to appropriate it. Taking this reasoning 
to IPR, it follows that if an entrepreneur creates an innovative, novel inven-
tion, they have a moral right to own and reap benefits from it.
Of  course,  there  is  little  opposition  against  the  protection  of  rewards 
justly earned. However, the like-for-like comparison between intangible in-
tellectual creations and physical creations is problematic when Locke’s la-
bour  theory is  closely examined.  The idea  that  the  labourer  should take 
from unowned commons and then distinguish it through labour is difficult 
to compare to intellectual  creations. It requires that these intellectual cre-
ations  came  from  unique,  previously  unowned  foundational  knowledge 
(Gosseries,  Marciano,  &  Strowel,  2008,  p.41).  Few  intellectual  creations 
spring from unchartered knowledge; much research is evolutionary, build-
ing  on  pre-existing  research,  and this  learning  from the  work  before  it: 
‘designs for new products invariably incorporate elements taken from exist-
ing products ... [reuse is] a prerequisite for the evolutionary nature of tech-
nological change’ (Arthur, 2009; Faulkner & Runde, 2011, p.11). Moreover, it 
is questionable to what extent intellectual creations could be attributed to 
the producer’s environment and culture. Pinpointing origination and labour 
is difficult, as it requires a direct ‘one-to-one’ relationship between the pro-
ducer and the product (Gosseries, Marciano, & Strowel, 2008, p.41). Locke’s 
perspectives on the moral right to benefit from labour are clear, yet the com-
parison between physical creations and intellectual creations is not. Given 
16 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 8:1
that some of the justifications of IPR are based on the nature of tangible 
property, it is unsurprising that growth and development of IP legislation 
was often considered through these lens. 
Recent developments have indeed shown that IP is progressively treated 
more and more as property: the duration of initial rights has since increased 
(Carrier, 2004, p.15), ‘American courts, periodicals, and public rhetoric seem 
to  have  engaged  almost  exclusively  in  ‘property  talk’  when  discussing 
copyright’ (Vaidhyanathan, 2001, p.12),  and property has been framed as 
being ‘anything of value’ (Litman, 1999, p.1726). Comparisons and analo-
gies to physical property in IP debates are typical ‘showstoppers of persua-
sion’, which is further encouraged in light of the growing economic signific-
ance of IP in developed markets (Radin M. J., 2004, p.400). Lessig commen-
ted that the general IP protection discourse ‘has been framed as a battle 
about the rule of  law and respect  for  property.’  (Lessig,  2004,  p.10) This 
framing effectively makes it difficult to question issues of authorship, ori-
ginality, duration, access and use copyright because the ‘discussion ends’ 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2001, p.12) once property rights are brought into play. This 
is because property rights are seen as fundamental and ‘cannot’ be in dis-
pute (Patry, 2009, p.78).
The aim of this research is not to examine the technical or legal aspects of 
copyright. Instead, it seeks to frame the question of how discourses regard-
ing SOPA’s hearings reconcile the virtual, weightless flows of digital objects 
with  the  material.  Equating  immaterial  objects  with  material  objects  at-
tempts to eliminate the many differences between the two, such as features 
of non-rivalry, third-party editability, and reusability. This may cut short 
most discussion on whether immaterial objects should be treated differently 
even  if  they  conform  to  alternative  economic  principles  (Quah,  2005). 
Frames often conceal embedded assumptions and remove avenues for crit-
ical questioning, cementing them into cultural frames to become ‘common 
sense’ (Chudžíková, 2011, p.116; see also Wodak, 2006).
Other tensions also crop up within the debate of intellectual  property 
and immateriality/materiality. The concept of IP often defies clear categor-
isation; IPR are sometimes haphazardly debated to the various axes of prop-
erty/intangible goods, natural/artificial right, sovereignty/globalisation, and 
regulation/laissez-faire (Boyle, 1997, p.180). IPR strives to strike a balance 
between those scales, although the result may involve the constant re-shuff-
ling of IPR. For example, when information assets cross borders, national le-
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gislation purporting to manage these data flows will need to assert its influ-
ence over national grounds to control something that has been described as 
largely  ‘deterritorialised’  and ‘disembodied’  (Levina  & Kien,  2010,  p.82). 
New methods will need to be developed, such as exerting control over large 
intermediaries to prohibit  access to ‘national’ markets (e.g. SOPA, Title I, 
§102),  discouragement  by  harsh  criminalisation  of  the  infringing  citizen 
(Wessels,  2010),  embedding  powerful  frames into  the  discourse  of copy-
right, and so on.
These lines of discussion resonate with discourse studies, and research 
shows that linguistic tools such as metaphors (Patry, 2009, p.49), labelling 
(Monica, 2001), repetition (Patry, 2009, p.38), omission of key details (Bettig, 
1992, p.150), and appeals to tradition or ‘authority’ (Rojo & van Dijk, 1997) 
are  often  wielded  to  help  distinguish  between  morality/immorality, 
legality/illegality, ‘pirate’/consumer, and material/immaterial. Further ana-
lysis on metaphors and other linguistic tools will be explained in the find-
ings section.
2.5 THEORETICAL BASIS: AN OVERVIEW
In the review, I first contextualised the research question by discussing the 
different interpretations of globalisation and the information society, as well 
as questions of national limitations and border-constructions. More specific-
ally, I also explored the networked nature of borders as a result of globalisa-
tion and growing salience of information. However, I attempted to root the 
discussion into a more holistic framework by referring to Castells’ and van 
Dijk’s conceptions of the networked society. Information is not static, but in-
teracts with different spheres of society on cultural and social levels.
I argued that the ubiquity of networked information flows can also be at-
tributed to the mobile  objects  themselves.  I  therefore looked at  different 
views on the characteristics of immaterial objects; the relationship between 
the immaterial  with the material;  and impact of immateriality on various 
actors.  The discussion underlined the various tensions and dependencies 
between  the  material  and immaterial.  These  tensions  are  contextual  but 
ever-present within the smallest levels of bit strings in pocket calculators to 
networked, national infrastructures. The user is also impacted and is now 
closer than before to the economic core of production, consumption and dis-
semination. Through the malleability of digital objects, we are able to influ-
ence and re-negotiate the networked borders and digital intermediaries.
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In other words, this literature review attempted to portray a cross-sec-
tion of the many interlinking relationships involved in the tensions between 
the material/immaterial (note: each node, as shown in the diagram below, 
harbours its own set of tensions e.g. physical borders versus networked bor-
ders):
Figure 1: Brief outline of literature review
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
At this point, it is important to weave together the different concepts con-
sidered above into a workable framework. I first present the outer frame, 
which is  comprised of van Dijk’s (1999) conception of the networked in-
formation society and Giddens’ (1990) condition of time-space distanciation, 
highlighting  how  these  networks  join  previously  unconnected,  cross-
bordered arenas. This frame is tempered by Sassen’s (1996) work on the in-
tricate symbiotic relationship of immaterial to the material (i.e. the essential 
anchoring of ‘intangible’ networks to physical infrastructures), stressing the 
constant tensions at play.
Secondly, the sub-frame incorporates the above theories into the debate 
and also draws from Kallinikos et al.’s theory of digital objects (2010) e.g.  
the way they form ecologies of fluid digital connections and disconnections. 
It takes note of the way digital intermediaries between the physical users 
and the digital records are produced as a result of the decomposability and 
editability  of  digital  objects.  Furthermore,  the  framework  acknowledges 
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how these features modify the role of the user into a producer of networked 
borders, supporting Kallinikos’ conceptualisations of the ecologies of fluid 
associations. 
The  sub-frame  additionally  includes  concepts  of  border-construction. 
Firstly, the ‘membrane’ that demarcates the virtual from the physical infra-
structure will be examined through Aas’ (2007) and Beck’s (2003) perspect-
ives that these borders are not simply static, but actively constructed, dy-
namic processes which also form global/local networks. It follows that be-
cause these borders are influenced by everyday actors,  they may also be 
constructed by discourses of interested parties such as SOPA supporters, 
government departments and corporations. 
Secondly,  understandings  of  the  way linguistic  tools  (e.g.  metaphors, 
similes) drawn from Patry’s (2009) seminal work will be incorporated into 
the study. This  framework therefore looks to comb through SOPA’s dis-
courses and uncover the embedded assumptions that influence border-con-
struction and, furthermore, expose alternative articulations of the nature of 
networks and the characteristics of intellectual property and digital objects.
4. RESEARCH QUESTION
This study seeks to critically analyse the SOPA legislative hearing to uncov-
er latent discourses about the way materiality and immateriality in IP regu-
lation are represented in the SOPA debates. In particular, it seeks to expose  
underlying assumptions on: (a) copyright protection within a networked in-
formation society; and (b) the qualitative nature of digital objects and copy-
righted  goods.  These  two  lines  of  inquiry  will  aim  to  make  known  the 
power struggles embedded in the texts, e.g. the re-naming of copyright in-
fringement to ‘theft’  to emphasise the ‘materiality’  of digital  copyrighted 
works.
The full research question is as follows:
RQ: How does the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) legislative hearing 
construct notions of materiality and immateriality?
Sub-RQ1: How does the hearing portray information networked societ-
ies?
Sub-RQ2: How does the hearing articulate the qualitative features of di-
gital intellectual property?
This topic was chosen for study because IP regulation is a subject thick 
with rhetoric and moral panics - and may potentially benefit from some cla-
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rification (Logie, 2006). While regulation explicitly purports to control cul-
tural and information flows (Pang, 2006, p.2; Barron, 2012, p.2), regulation, 
by itself,  does not shape perceptions on the way IP rights should be as-
signed. Instead, it is through the work of selective and persuasive framing 
that IP regulation gains the momentum to further the agendas of interested 
parties.  Uncovering  these  discourses  is  therefore  central  to  encouraging 
open  and  transparent  discussion  about  IP  regulation.  Currently,  Lessig 
(2004, p.10) laments that certain frames prevent burning discussions from 
reaching the table, resulting in many unanswered questions on the nature of 
IP protection.
Previous research on IP regulation tend to isolate specific parts of the de-
bate (e.g. near-exclusive emphasis on information societies or the rhetoric of 
piracy)  and few are likely to  adopt more holistic  approaches (Loughlan, 
2006; Philip, 2005; Yung, 2008). Research on the applied nature and struc-
ture of digital objects in the context of IP infringement is also limited. This 
study attempts to bridge that gap by analysing discourses of materiality and 
immateriality, because issues of materiality are present at all stages of the 
information ecology, consequently outlining a more integrated approach. 
This study may highlight alternative ways of understanding materiality/im-
materiality in IP debates and potentially help encourage constructive de-
bates on IP regulation. 
5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 CHOOSING CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
This  study used critical  discourse analysis (CDA) to answer the research 
questions presented above. CDA was by far the most appropriate methodo-
logy for the research questions as it is fundamentally rooted in the idea that  
discourses  always contain  power struggles;  these  discourses  are situated 
within the exchange and contestation of power (Locke, 2004, p.25). Specific-
ally, CDA aims to critique postulates and ‘common sense’ (Brahim, 2011, 
p.26), which is crucial for uncovering embedded discourses. Similarly, my 
research topic focuses on latent, institutionalised portrayals about informa-
tion societies and virtual objects because discussions relating to IP regula-
tion are often thick with assumptions – see Sag, Jacobi, & Sytch, 2009. CDA 
was a clear choice for this study as it is precisely about exposing these artic-
ulations. 
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Alternative qualitative methods were considered (quantitative methods 
were deemed inappropriate because they do not efficiently analyse latent 
power structures), such as discourse analysis and interviews. It was found 
that these methods could not approach the research question with the same 
level  of  effectiveness.  Discourse  analysis  places  less  emphasis  on  power 
structures and the examination of the ‘institutional processes’ that produced 
it (Fairclough, 1992, p.16). Interviews were unfeasible because it would have 
required interviewing the SOPA hearing participants (all of which are high-
profile  figures).  Secondly,  interviewers  focus  most  heavily  on  the  inter-
viewee’s speech/content, which is not as relevant to the research question of 
investigating background power structures and assumptions (1995, p.95).
Fairclough’s method for CDA was chosen because its approach facilit-
ates the examination of power struggles at three levels: text, discourse prac-
tices, and wider social practices (Fairclough, 1995, p.74). I also incorporated 
elements from van Leeuwen (2005), Halliday (2004), and Wood & Kroger 
(2000) in the three stages, as they provide helpful signposts on the analysis 
process (e.g. van Leeuwen’s work helped identify different forms of legitim-
ization in the texts). All three levels are important to uncovering underlying 
assumptions crucial to answering this research question. Other CDA meth-
ods, such as from Pecheux et al. and Fowler et al, place less emphasis on 
identifying power structures in the texts, and consequently are slightly less 
applicable (Fairclough, 1992, p.29-30). 
Some  potential  limitations  to  Fairclough’s  method  should  be  noted: 
firstly, there is a danger of ‘ideational bias’ unjustifiably influencing the res-
ults (e.g. if I am in favour of a ‘regulation-free’ Internet, I may be especially 
critical with pro-copyright discourses); and secondly, there is a question of 
how  generalisable  the  results  are.  In  response  to  the  former  criticism, 
Saville-Troike  (2003)  argues  that  CDA  should include  some ‘acknowledged 
political,  ideological  and  ethical  stance’  (my  emphasis),  as  this  is  what 
makes it ‘critical’. Three procedures, clarified through a pilot study, were 
used to reduce the possibility of unacknowledged bias as much as possible: 
concerted researcher reflexivity, use of a more structured  methodological 
framework, and independent peer feedback. However, it is  impossible to 
completely eliminate all possibilities and I encourage interested readers to 
refer to the appendix for a more comprehensive breakdown of the interpret-
ation stage.
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The latter limitation about generalisability relates to the fact that this re-
search  question  involves  analysing  a  case  study  of  SOPA hearings.  The 
main critique of using case studies is the purported lack of generalisability 
(Yin, 2003). As I mentioned in the literature review above (page 14), this re-
search question lends itself better to case-study analysis because, when con-
textualised, it ‘retain[s] the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-
life events’ (Yin, 2003, p.2). Examining the discursive relationship between 
the material and immaterial  in a networked society is  difficult  without a 
concrete case to anchor it because of its vastness and multiplicity: such a po-
sition requires some reification through context.
Stake suggests that a case study should be judged on the learning poten-
tial rather than simply generalisability (1995). Accordingly, the SOPA hear-
ings were chosen because I view them as significant opportunities to ‘learn’ 
about the construction of materiality and immateriality from several differ-
ent perspectives. Rarely has a contemporary IP bill generated so much dis-
cussion from different players in the Internet ecosystem regarding issues of 
nationalism, jurisdiction and information dissemination. In following Yin’s 
argument that case studies should ‘generalize theories (analytical generaliz-
ation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical  generalization)’  (2003, 
p.10), I also sought to compare the results with the theoretical body to ex-
amine alternative retellings, contradictions and consistencies.
5.2 SAMPLING 
The SOPA Congress hearings on the 16th November 2011 were the chosen 
texts for  this  research question.  The focus on SOPA was justified on the 
basis that it highlights salient questions relevant to the research question, 
e.g. the tensions between national boundaries and vast information flows; 
and representations of immaterial copyrighted works with the material as-
pects of digital ‘theft’.
Secondly, the hearing on the 16th of November was selected because it 
involved testimonies from different stakeholders of the Internet ecosystem, 
providing a ‘meeting point’ for all the disparate issues to surface. This hear-
ing discussed the moral, economic and cultural rationales of the bill, provid-
ing insight  into the stated goals,  embedded assumptions and interests of 
each party. As conflicting discourses and alternative representations were 
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articulated, this created rich opportunities to investigate the research ques-
tion at hand.
In total, there were seven written testimonials submitted on the 16th of 
November, including the Chairman’s initial statement of support for SOPA. 
Six of the testimonials were chosen for study, as I wanted to create a diverse 
corpus involving different stakeholders representing a myriad of issues re-
lating to the research question;  overlaps in positions (e.g. more than one 
testimonial  from intermediaries)  were carefully excluded from the study. 
While  this  may have reduced the  findings,  the corpus  on the  whole  ac-
counts for a breadth of opinions, positions and interests. 
Analysing all of the verbal and oral debates related to SOPA would have 
resulted in over 50,000 words to analyse. Although this would have been 
the most comprehensive path, time constraints and the chosen methodology 
would  have  rendered  this  unmanageable.  Additionally,  only  the  written  
testimonials were examined as these are the most ‘complete’ form of each 
party’s arguments, and therefore enabled more in-depth CDA.
5.3 PROCEDURE
The  process  of  analysis  was  threefold:  firstly,  the  testimonials  were  ex-
amined for key themes alongside the conceptual framework (border-con-
struction, immateriality, physicality, information flows, rhetorical devices, 
etc.) to identify the main contrasts and connections within each text and in 
comparison with other texts. 
The second stage involved finer analyses using Fairclough’s three-stage 
method (2001) and incorporated elements from van Leeuwen (2005), Halli-
day (2004), and Wood & Kroger (2000) within the model. Reflections from a 
pilot study also resulted in more sub-elements to each stage that were previ-
ously lacking. Textual analysis involved examination of lexicalisation, legit-
imisation,  metaphor,  simile,  comparison,  modality,  patterns  of  cohesion, 
patterns of transitivity, and textual hybridity. Analysis on discourse prac-
tices  examined  genre,  absence/presence  of  voice,  information  focus,  as-
sumptions, and legitimisation. Examination at the level of social practices 
involved uncovering constructions of identities and history, reproduction of 
hegemonic  practices,  the  use  of  objects/instruments  or  times/places,  and 
representation  of  activities.  This  was  done  manually  and  portions  were 
highlighted and annotated according to a colour code (yellow for textual 
analysis,  green  for  discourse  practices,  and  blue  for  social  practices,  al-
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though some were highlighted multiple colours due to linkages between the 
three dimensions). I also received peer feedback on randomly selected ex-
cerpts of the findings.
The third stage of analysis  involved intertextual  analysis  by summar-
ising the key points around several nodes of interest: Networked Informa-
tion Society, Digital Objects & Infringement, Consumer Identity, and Inter-
mediaries. These points were incorporated into a table of comparisons, each 
divided by the stakeholder and Fairclough’s level of analysis. This enabled 
easier comparison of points across different levels and stakeholders. 
6. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Testimonials from Katherine Oyama (Google), John Clark (Pfizer), Paul Al-
meida (Department of Professional Employees of American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations), Lamar Smith (Committee 
Chairman of SOPA), Maria Pallante (Register of Copyrights), and Michael 
O’Leary  (Motion  Picture  Association  of  America)  were  analysed.  I  com-
pared and contrasted the various individual findings to illustrate the dom-
inant and resistant threads of discourse across the key topics.
6.1 THE (UN)NETWORKED SOCIETY
(Note: the texts do not refer directly to the information society and instead 
use concepts such as the ‘Internet’ or ‘networks’ to describe the phenomena 
of transferring, connecting and disseminating from distant localities. While 
they are not completely equivalent, they are not mutually exclusive: the In-
ternet plays a crucial  role in the progress and growth of the overall net-
worked information society. For purposes of this study, statements on the 
Internet/networks will be taken to relate to concepts of the information soci-
ety, although it will be noted that these statements will not relate to the en-
tirety of the information society.)
Discourse  on  the  networked  information  society  across  the  different 
testimonials  is  strikingly  Janus-faced.  It  is  largely  split  into  two  main 
branches  of  discourse  –  the  ‘legitimate’/’innovative’  sector  juxtaposed 
against  the  ‘illicit’  marketplace  of  unlawfully  disseminated  copyrighted 
goods. This is consistently discernable across almost all of the testimonials. 
On one side, Clark refers to the Internet as a ‘threat’ and Pallante similarly  
speaks of the ‘dark side of the Internet’; on the other hand, Google describes 
it as one of the ‘few bright lights of our economy’. The binary metaphors of 
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dark and light suggest a degree of fragmentation over what it means to par-
ticipate in the information network. 
Each branch of discourse harbours its own set of embedded topics: the 
‘illicit’ view of the information network lends itself more to brusquer lexic-
alisation, such as naming those who engage unlawfully with this ‘side’ of 
the  Internet  as  ‘thieves’  (Almeida,  O’Leary,  Pallante,  Smith),  or  ‘rogues’ 
(Oyama, Pallante, Smith, O’Leary). Delving into etymology and lexicalisa-
tion further, the noun ‘rogue’ is derived from vagrant or vagabond (Harper, 
2001), constructing the image of a nation-less, homeless and lawless figure 
far beyond the reach of any legitimate,  law-abiding network. The phrase 
‘foreign rogue’ is repeated a total of eleven times in reference to copyright 
infringing websites; if connotations of vagrancy was not a sufficient indica-
tion of alterity, ‘foreign’ makes it explicit. 
This discursive thread attempts to demarcate between ‘areas’ of the In-
ternet using sensory adjectives of light/dark and introducing identities of 
lawless  otherness  into  the  discussion.  The  deliberate  parallels  between 
physical geographies and Internet geographies are clear. From this discurs-
ive thread, however, two themes emerge: firstly, the numerous associations 
of IP regulation with war-like terms; and secondly, the purported impact of 
the virtual society on the ‘physical’ society. 
Readers  are  immediately  aware  of  the  liberal  incorporation  of  words 
such as ‘fight’, ‘threat’ or ‘combat’ (all testimonials) when referring to the 
problem  of  curtailing  copyright  infringement.  The  consequences  of  un-
caught  copyright  infringement  are  similarly  ‘destructive’  (O’Leary)  and 
‘cause immense damage’ (Pallante).These terms underline connotations of a 
physical, imminent war and this is mirrored across the different texts. For 
example, Oyama warned Congress that SOPA could potentially cause ‘col-
lateral damage’ to legitimate businesses, and Pallante referred to the act of 
severing a foreign rogue website from payment processes as ‘starving’ them 
out, reminiscent of war-time tactics. I agree with Mirghani’s claim that these 
acts of ‘linguistic aggression’ are attempts by interested parties to gain dom-
inance (2011, p.114). Copyright infringement is widespread and largely cir-
cumvented by those who do not feel compelled to legitimately obtain copy-
righted goods. Framing the discussion in terms of an epidemic (Pfizer) or a 
war are a few ways to stress the urgency of the issue. 
However, efforts to  bridge the physical to the virtual with palpable de-
scriptions may involve a slightly subtler shift in argument. For instance, the 
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majority of Clark’s testimonial on behalf of Pfizer emphasised his own cred-
ibility as an ex-Immigrations and Customs Enforcer (ICE), the ‘unsanitary’ 
conditions where counterfeit drugs are produced and the ‘toxic ingredients’ 
often found in counterfeit drugs: ‘Counterfeit medicines are a global problem, 
one from which no region, country ... is immune.’ (Clark, my emphasis) The 
testimonial  is  initially  at  odds with the  others,  as  it  starts  with  a  global 
standpoint  and refrains  from mentioning topics  relating to the economy, 
commerce and profit. There is no mention of the issue of copyright for sev-
eral paragraphs, until it mentions ‘the major threat to patients in the U.S.’:  
hoodwinked ‘patients’ going to unauthorised online pharmacies and order-
ing counterfeit drugs. Given that SOPA is a bill purporting to impede access 
to the online infringer/vendor, the large amount of space taken to underline 
the seriousness of physical counterfeit drugs appears counterintuitive. 
The decreased focus on the online network and increased attention on 
the manifest harms of counterfeit medicine creates a new line of discourse: 
no longer are harms derived from copyright infringement only contained to 
intangible lost profits  - they are now connected to sophisticated criminal  
‘enterprises’ (Clark) with potentially grave consequences. His background 
as an ICE also becomes more evident: this is about physical networks and 
tangible products. ‘Counterfeits taint the original products with their inferi-
or quality. More important, counterfeits kill. When brakes are fake, drivers 
die.’ (Almeida). Framing the discussion in this way makes it difficult to en-
gage in candid and critical debate. As Litman argues, ‘if you're dissatisfied 
with the way the spoils are getting divided, one approach is to change the 
rhetoric. When you conceptualize the law as a balance between copyright 
owners and the public, you set up a particular dichotomy ... that constrains 
the choices you are likely to make.’ (2006, p.15) Secondly, it also blurs over 
the stages where the consumer goes to the website and discerns whether or 
not to buy these counterfeit products. The voice of the consumer (let alone 
opportunities  for  consumer  education)  is  very much silenced;  Clark uni-
formly refers to them as ‘easily ... deceived’ ‘patients’. 
The concept of the information society, then, becomes severely minim-
ised through this line of discourse. It becomes a mere gateway to networks 
situated  outside  the  virtual.  ‘Misuse’  (Smith)  of  the  Internet  can lead to 
stimulation of cross-border criminal  networks. Alternatively, legally-sanc-
tioned online distribution platforms can allegedly help benefit networks of 
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local economies and employment: ‘Our industry also includes more than 
95,000 small businesses across the country that are involved in the produc-
tion and distribution of movies and television ... and beyond even these are 
the hundreds of thousands of other businesses that every year provide ser-
vices to productions, like the local drycleaner that served the cast and crew 
on location  or  the local  hardware store  that  supplied  paint  and lumber’ 
(O’Leary). 
This is what the testimonials refer to as the ‘legitimate’ side of the Inter-
net.  This  is  where  the  ‘flow  of  revenue’  (Smith)  should  ideally  stream 
through – where growth is accelerating by ‘leaps and bounds’ and innova-
tion is ‘off the charts’ (O’Leary). Importantly, these metaphors of movement 
and dynamism are anchored to connotations of economic benefit (though it 
should be noted that economic gain is commonly highlighted in policy de-
bates regardless).  While Oyama did briefly mention that the Internet is  a 
‘universe of information’, most of the discourse about the Internet and flows 
of information liken it to a ‘digital distribution system’ (O’Leary) - in other 
words, a vehicle for transferring entertainment to consumers. The nature of 
this relationship appears to be described as a supplier-to-consumer rather 
than a  user-to-user  relationship  of  mutual  production  and consumption. 
Within the corpus, the main examples of lawful networks are the advert-
ising networks (Oyama, O’Leary) and authorised video streaming of movies 
(Pallante, Smith) – both of which involve the user as a paying consumer 
rather than an active participant: ‘Consumers now have numerous ways to 
enjoy streamed content legally through legitimate video streaming websites 
like Hulu or Netflix...’ (Pallante, my emphasis) 
The separation of the Internet to either illicit  or legitimate has created 
two sets of discourses and ‘proximities’: a ‘dark’ side inhabited by lawless 
‘thieves’ engaged in constant ‘battles’ with the State, both virtual and real; 
and the Internet  as  a  distribution  repository for  passive  consumption of 
mainstream entertainment. Looking back at the conceptual framework, this 
portrayal of the networked information society is very different from van 
Dijk’s  conception  of  the  network  society,  which  is  characterised  by  net-
worked activities at all levels of society (individual, societal and organisa-
tional). The discourses uncovered here do not highlight any sense of con-
nectivity that is marked at all levels – instead, notions of connectivity are 
mostly reserved for privileged and paying consumers seeking to passively 
receive  a  service  (provider  to  consumer  rather  than  local  to  global). 
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Secondly, the ideological connection between certain ‘dark’ vicinities of the 
Internet and non-virtual networks such as counterfeit drugs operations does 
not quite resonate with Aas and Beck’s notions of borders as networks. The 
discourse examined above did not perceive the Internet as a network but a 
gateway for non-virtual networks, because it was taken for granted that un-
witting ‘patients’ who searched for online pharmacies online would most 
likely end up purchasing counterfeit goods (Clark). The result is a fragmen-
ted vision of the Internet as a purely commercial platform for passive con-
sumers on one hand - and lawlessness, vagrancy and illegality overreaching 
to real-life activities on the other. 
6.2 THE NAIVE USER
The discourse relating to the position, function and identity of the user is re-
markably consistent across almost all texts, save for Oyama’s testimonial. 
The lexicalisation techniques used to frame the user are penetrative and reg-
ular. To mention only a few, Clark unfailingly refers to buyers of medicinal 
drugs as ‘patients’ who are easily misled, deceived and ‘lured’ by the ‘pro-
fessional looking’ websites. These patients are under ‘threat’, ‘exposed’ to 
counterfeit  medicines,  ‘deprived’ of the active pharmaceutical  ingredient, 
and ‘rely’  on  Pfizer’s  products  –  Clark  provides  long  lists  of  numerous 
drugs that are counterfeited, citing grave diseases and conditions, including 
cancer (which was mentioned four times). The position of the patient is un-
derlined further with the use of passive sentences: actions are being thrust 
upon the patient,  who is  described as little more than a frail  figure with 
needs. The image of a vulnerable patient is evocative. 
On the other hand, O’Leary’s testimonial  refers to the user as a ‘con-
sumer’  of  ‘high-quality’  content,  albeit  not  a  particularly  discerning one. 
Consumers are also ‘exposed’ (noting the passive position of the subject) to 
different a set of problems, this time ‘subjected’ to ‘fraud and deceit... also to 
identity theft and other harms’. Unlike Clark, O’Leary’s text does consider 
producers and consumers as different: producers are described as legitimate 
‘hard-working people behind the scenes ... people like Dan Lemieux, a stunt 
coordinator in Michigan, who depends on the residual payments he earns 
to help support his wife and three children’. These people do not have a 
uniform name like ‘producers’ but are referred to as ‘people’ with histories 
and identities, such as ‘Budecke’s Paints & Decorating of Baltimore, Mary-
land, a fifth-generation family-owned and-operated retailer’. These are the 
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people who ‘create’ a product and are ‘exploited’ for profits by ‘thieves’. 
The image of a humane, hardworking producer is supported by O’Leary’s 
focus on the phenomenological; the experience of living, contributing and 
producing on an everyday basis.
In contrast, O’Leary refers to unlawful actors as ‘feeding consumer con-
fusion’, suggesting infantile images of the consumer. When faced with the 
claim  that  consumers  will  still  seek  other  unlawful  offshore  free  con-
tent-providing sites  if  SOPA is  passed,  O’Leary simply  asserts that  ‘con-
sumers do not look for rogue sites when they search, they look for content – 
and [SOPA] will help ensure that the content they find is legitimate.’ The 
simplification of the well-meaning consumer as being herded to ‘legitimate’ 
content ignores the multifaceted politics of consumer choice, and the issues 
of  accessing  to  up-to-date  content  currently  impeding  the  legal  content 
streaming market. O’Leary’s perception of the innocent, receptive consumer 
is at also odds with MPAA’s own history of prosecuting individual ‘con-
sumers who steal our product’ (Johnson, 2005). Given the controversy and 
high-profile furore surrounding the bill, it is likely that maintaining good 
relations with the consumer and appearing sympathetic to the general cit-
izen was a priority of all testifiers. However, through this, the portrayal of 
the user as ‘unwitting’ (Pallante) contrasts sharply with the ‘empowered’ 
(Pallante) and wronged copyright owner and producer. 
Given Google’s stance against that version of SOPA, it is unsurprising 
that Oyama’s testimonial paints the user differently from the other findings 
discussed above. Oyama refers to consumers as ‘citizens’ and ‘users’ explor-
ing the ‘vibrant platform for democratic ... expression’ that is the Internet. 
The name ‘citizen’  also finds  roots in  terms relating to ‘[engagement] in 
political  activity’  (my emphasis;  see  Harper,  2001).  Furthermore,  the  text 
makes a very different assumption to O’Leary’s discourse: users can make a 
choice to learn and circumvent and subvert technological changes (‘... easily 
circumvented by the user or foreign web site ... SOPA’s provisions in this  
regard are not  likely to  prevent  users from learning how to evade DNS 
blockades’). It envisions the actions of users to be disparate and, to some ex-
tent, beyond the control of the web host: ‘[it is] a high probability that all so-
cial networking and user-generated content sites are used for infringement 
by some’. The incongruent views of the user as a passive consumer, duped 
patient,  and astute learner are all useful  tools to furthering a chosen dis-
course. The creative, discerning producer/consumer need not be protected 
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by the State in the same way that a vulnerable ‘patient’ is. Through cement-
ing  user  identities  as  passive  and  susceptible  consumers,  this  also 
strengthens the potency of in-group beliefs and the rejection of the ‘Other’, 
e.g. unlawful ‘rogues’ or alternative, unfavourable discourses (see: Ryan & 
Bogart, 1997). 
Comparing these findings to the conceptual framework sparks a number 
of implications. Firstly, Aas and Beck’s theory of the collectively constructed 
border-network starkly differs from the discourses presented here: the con-
sumer does not construct or substantially contribute, but is instead affected 
by these  pre-constructed  networks in  the  same way water  is  redirected, 
without complaint, when the course is altered. By privileging the identities 
of the producers/workers, the role of the consumer/user is downplayed; the 
State is justified in changing the status quo because these consumers require 
active ‘protection’.
The question therefore remains: what does this mean with regards to the 
research question at hand? Despite the body of theory on the generativity 
and editability of the digital object within networked societies, the culture 
for altering and tinkering is absent from this discourse. Discussions pertain-
ing to the potential impacts of digital objects are omitted, while the authen-
ticity of corporeal objects (e.g. the legitimacy of fire alarms) are emphasised. 
The user is seen as a passive receiver of digital and virtual objects, while di-
gital networks are seen as mere paths to the potentially ‘harmful’ material 
world that the consumer should be ‘steered’ away from (Smith).
6.3 STEALING THE DIGITAL OBJECT
At the centre of the debate is the question of how IP infringement should be 
depicted. One dominant line of discourse in the corpus is the plethora of 
language emphasising the materiality of copyright infringement. Terms such 
as ‘digital theft’, ‘theft wage’, ‘stolen works’, ‘thieves’, ‘rogues’, ‘cyberlock-
ers’ (O’Leary), and ‘pirates’ are plentiful; the effects of copyright infringe-
ment have also been described as ‘corrosive’, ‘damaging’ (Smith) and caus-
ing ‘devastation’ (Pallante). This is purely at the textual level – at levels of 
discourse and social practice, wider themes emerge. For example, the prolif-
eration of counterfeit medicines caused by unauthentic online pharmacies 
has been linked to the Hezbollah (Clark), while copyright infringers have 
also been accused of tax theft, job theft, benefits theft, livelihood theft and 
even the potential death of others (Almeida). These terms help evoke senti-
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ments of nationalism – the American against the terrorist; the thief against 
the law-abiding citizen – and consequently encourage protection of these 
trade and cultural borders.
Secondly, the digital creation is placed squarely within the axis of eco-
nomic potential and commerce; it  is product constituted by possibility of 
creating revenue for a large network of actors (‘the producer may commis-
sion songwriters, composers, and musicians... for use of [your creation]’ - 
Pallante). The result derived from this discourse is the bewildering portray-
als of objects with no clear qualities of their own (e.g. no inherent function,  
editability, size, flexibility, accessibility) except for an apparent materiality 
and  impact  on  many  sectors  of  society,  including  the  ‘local  drycleaner’ 
(O’Leary).  Though this,  statements  such  as  the  ‘[The]  First  Amendment 
does not protect stealing goods off trucks’ (used as a reason to strengthen IP 
protection;  Almeida)  slip  past  critical  examination  because  there was no 
clear  framework for  how we should regard copyrighted goods.  In  other 
words, questions on the difference between material and digital goods and 
the creation process of digital goods are skirted. Chudžíková (2011, p.474) 
warns that this type of ‘schemata is preserved via their generational trans-
ference by national narratives-metaphors, analogies, insinuations ... which 
implant them deeper in cultural frames and transform them into common 
sense.’ 
Drawing from Kallinikos’ views on the digital objects, it is argued that 
there  are key differences  between the material  and immaterial.  As men-
tioned prior, the characteristics of non-rivalry, decomposability and editab-
ility mean that digital objects are replicable at almost no cost, constantly ed-
ited and dynamic.  Furthermore, it  defies  the normal constraints of space 
and time (Giddens). On the other hand, the idea of theft usually involves a 
thief, without consent, appropriating the victim’s property and the depriva-
tion of  that  property  from the victim (e.g.  see  Arizona State  Legislature, 
2012),  while  there  is  no such physical  deprivation  in  copyright  infringe-
ment. Although the definition of theft (and indeed any word) is prone to 
change, there are implications when connecting the physical appropriation 
of property with copyright infringement. As Patry (2009, p.78) warns, ‘copy-
right owners have attempted to avoid regulation by describing their right as 
intellectual property ...  outside the need for any empirical social justifica-
tions ... it’s axiomic and need not be justified.’ 
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For example, O’Leary stated that author has a ‘right’ to ‘reap the rewards 
of his or her creative work’. This shift away from informed debate into rhet-
orical/metaphorical arena manages to sidestep difficult questions (e.g. how 
long the exclusive right should stand) and quietly assumes that the copy-
right  owner  did  not  benefit  from  any  previous  works  (Loughlan,  2006, 
p.224). At the core of this agrarian metaphor is the conflation of the physical 
with the immaterial: a farmer labours the earth for his work and is physic-
ally deprived from him by the ‘rogue’ or ‘thief’. This metaphor evokes the 
idea that the State should step in to protect his labour, without any onus on 
the creator to reconcile with the pace of information-filled markets or the 
culture of creation/editing (Lessig, 2008) in networked societies. 
The  discourse  of  copyrighted  works  as  tangible  contrasts  with 
Kallinikos’  view of the digital  object and Giddens’  concept of space-time 
distanciation. O’Leary argues that ‘major motion pictures ... appear on these 
rogue sites just days, if not hours, after their theatrical release’; there is some 
acknowledgement of the portability and decomposability of digital goods, 
although it is often framed within a commercial context of video streaming 
to the paying consumer. The discourse surrounding the flexibility of the di-
gital object remains focused on materiality in two ways – firstly, materiality 
as a quality of the copyrighted work (digital ‘theft’ and ‘property’); and its  
manifest, substantial impact on the non-virtual networks and economies.
6.4 THE MALLEABLE BORDERS
In SOPA’s discourse, there are two types of ‘borders’ that are discussed: na-
tional borders, which outline the geographical arena of a nation-state, and 
technological  borders.  Technological  borders are search engines acting as 
the point of contact between the material user and digital objects dissemin-
ated around the information network. Following Aas and Beck’s definition 
of a ‘border’, an intermediary such as a search engine performs the function 
of an Internet ‘border’ because it filters, connects and also emulates a dis-
tributed network – a results page is constituted by the different search quer-
ies and hundreds of different actors. 
A prominent theme within the texts is the way these borders are negoti-
ated by the different stakeholders. As mentioned above, SOPA created new 
obligations  for  technological  borders/search  engines  to  actively  monitor 
their search results for links to infringed content, and sever links to websites 
hosting infringed material. The intent of this is to ‘starve’ out websites by 
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substantially reducing the amount of visitors and therefore advertising rev-
enue, disrupting the Internet ecosystem for copyright infringers. National 
borders are often used as points of reference and comparison, reinforcing 
the image of a relatively fixed and impermeable nature of national borders.
There are two main branches of discourse relating to intermediaries. The 
dominant discourse portrays the border (both technological and national) as 
state-influenced and mandated, while an alternative argument depicts the 
border as a site of technological negotiation. Testimonials from O’Leary, Pal-
lante, Clark and Smith strongly favour a state-influenced view of the Inter-
net ‘border’, using terms such as ‘ordered’ (O’Leary),  ‘obligation’ (Smith) 
and ‘required to comply’ (Pallante) when referring to the legislative obliga-
tions towards technological borders. Parallels are drawn alongside national 
borders, where Smith iterates that ‘we cannot continue a system that allows 
criminals to disregard our laws and import counterfeit and  pirated goods 
across our physical borders.’ The deliberate inclusion of ‘pirated goods’ (a 
term nonexclusively used to refer to digital copyright infringement) in that 
statement clarifies his position that, regardless if the product is tangible or 
intangible, it will treated equally with regards to border-crossing and entry 
into the US market. 
Additionally, Pallante argues that ‘stopping infringement at the borders 
is not a new concept of American copyright law’, attempting to justify simil-
ar legal treatment for both digital copyrighted goods and non-digital goods. 
Looking back at Harvey’s concepts of space-time compression, the urgency 
to control technological borders becomes more apparent. Internet ‘harms’ 
are exacerbated by the contortion of space and time; with the instantaneous 
delivery  of  content,  Pallante  claims  that  ‘quick’  and  ‘effective’  blocking 
would be appropriate. She urges that ‘every member of the Internet ecosys-
tem needs to play a role’ to curtail copyright infringement, attempting to 
border off the ‘foreign infringing websites’ through the cooperation of vari-
ous US-based networks.
However,  this  state-driven construction of the technological  border is 
contested by Oyama’s testimonial, expressing that maintaining the integrity 
of search engine results is a ‘serious technical undertaking’ involving nu-
merous cases of dealing with ‘hijack[ed] accounts’ which ‘evade detection’. 
The clear physical connotations above attempt to emphasise the technical 
and already-laborious burden that intermediaries such as Google allegedly 
tolerate, although this industry-driven position is unsurprising given that 
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the bill seeks to increase the obligations of search engines. This raises ques-
tions on the relationship between the technological border and the national 
border: how do conflicting discourses regarding the construction of techno-
logical borders reconcile? What is the emerging ‘image’ of the technological  
border?
Linking  these  observations  with  the  conceptual  framework,  the  main 
lines of discourse are congruent with Cooper & Rumford’s views that bor-
ders are dependent on the State’s legitimization. Out of the testimonials rep-
resented in Congress that day, Oyama’s testimonial was the only text that 
emphasised  discourse  on borders  as  a  site  for  technological  negotiation. 
Therefore, the border as collectively constructed (Cooper & Rumford, 2011), 
even  if  factually  valid  due  to  the  distributed  nature  of  search  engines 
(Kallinikos,  Aaltonen,  &  Marton,  2010),  appears  to  concur  less  with  the 
themes represented here. Furthermore, Aas’ concept of the border as a dis-
tributed network is turned on its head: it is  because  intermediaries such as 
Google are networks that it is required to block others according to State 
regulation. The equating of the physical border with the technological both 
in concept and in function helps alter the extent we view these technological 
borders as editable. 
7. CONCLUSION
As seen in the analysis, there are a number of underlying discourses relat-
ing to the treatment of materiality and immateriality of intellectual prop-
erty. There is a clear fragmentation of the Internet into vicinities of legitim-
acy and illegality. The online legitimate arena is characterised almost solely 
by commercial growth and profit potential, while the online illicit vicinities 
are said to ‘harbor’ more pernicious ‘foreign rogues’ who commit intellectu-
al  property  ‘theft’.  The  discourse  continues  into  the  non-virtual  sphere, 
where copyright infringement is linked to the illicit networks in the offline 
world, such as organised crime rings dealing in counterfeit medicines and 
defective products. On the other hand, the legitimate online sphere is also 
positively associated with legitimate offline networks, such as burgeoning 
local businesses and services benefiting from the production of intellectual 
property. This offline network is again framed through the lenses of eco-
nomic potential and profit. The information network is not so much a net-
work but a ‘gateway’ for the non-virtual world.
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Discourse on technological networks/borders represents these borders as 
being State-constructed with obligations to block off Internet vicinities from 
access; this is ‘justified’ by comparison to national borders and laws. Fur-
thermore, the information society is not portrayed as a site of user creativity 
or citizen production – the dominant discourses cloaking the ‘user’ include 
connotations of passivity, vulnerability, illness, and gullibility. Users pass-
ively consume content supplied by ‘workers’ and ‘professionals’, who are 
conversely  described  as  innovative,  hard-working,  unjustly  treated,  and 
with long-standing histories and sympathetic identities. 
The digital object is not viewed as malleable, flexible, decomposable or 
having characteristics of non-rival goods. Instead, they take on the features 
material goods, enabling the digital object to fit into the paradigm of non-
virtual theft. Consequently, the digital object is defined by materiality and 
economic potential both in the virtual and offline worlds. Words relating to 
battles,  threats,  wars,  and destruction  are liberally  invoked,  emphasising 
materiality. Secondly, heavy use of labelling and metaphors frame the de-
bate  in  terms  of  protecting  property;  this  is  advantageous  for  copyright 
owners  and  interested  parties.  The  discourses  privileging  the  copyright 
owner’s position contain latent assumptions that remain relatively unques-
tioned as a result. 
7.1 LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD
There are several possible directions for future research – some are derived 
from the limitations and gaps in this study, and others are related but fresh 
avenues. Firstly, there were few topics in the analysed texts relating directly 
to the entirety of the networked information society as described in the the-
oretical review; the themes were on the whole focused on the Internet. This 
particular project therefore analysed the immateriality/materiality of digital 
copyrighted material and not (for example) of public works, which have dif-
ferent functions and associations within the networked information society. 
Furthermore, the networked information society is not related solely to the 
Internet. There are other forms of media or technology with corresponding 
tensions between the material and immaterial; looking into these may help 
expand the scope of the research further and develop a more holistic per-
spective.
Lastly, while this research topic examined the editability and transferab-
ility of digital objects, an explicit focus on the discourse of generativity on 
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legislation or other platforms relating to user-generated content may illu-
minate this other side of the coin. Drawing out the underlying assumptions 
regarding this topic grows more pertinent as viewing home-made videos 
have become a significant part of mainstream entertainment.
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